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I. INTRODUCTION

Little in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has spurred
as much controversy as the Court's recognition of a constitutional
right to privacy. While implicitly acknowledging that such a right is
not listed in the text of the Constitution, in Griswold v. Connecticut
the Court found that the right existed in the "penumbras" of the
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amendments to the Constitution.' According to the Court, the right to
privacy was present in "emanations" from the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights. 2 This reasoning was notoriously extended to abortion in Roe v.
Wade. 3 In order to invalidate state regulation of abortion, the Roe
Court characterized abortion as an aspect of privacy, 4 which was a
substantive, "fundamental" liberty protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 In both of these decisions, the Court announced that an
unlisted, substantive right to privacy was inherent in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 6 This was an expansion of the
7
Court's previously created doctrine, substantive due process.
These decisions have since sparked a flurry of debate, among
both Supreme Court Justices and legal scholars. Some scholars decry
8
a constitutional right to privacy as wholly lacking textual support,
while others find such a right consistent with the purposes underlying
the text. 9 Several Justices have also criticized these decisions. 10

1.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152 (1973) ('The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.").
2.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
3.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
4.
Id.
5.
Id. at 152-53 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
6.
Id.; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86.
7.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 167-68 (Stewart, J., concurring).
8.
See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 31 (1990), quoted in James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality
in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 315 n.3 (1999) (describing
substantive due process as a "momentous sham"); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE
SUPREME COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 68-69 (1934), quoted in Wayne
McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right of Livelihood, 82 KY. L.J. 397, 401
(1994) (urging a common-sense procedural reading); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980), quoted in Ely, The Oxymoron Reconsidered, supra, at
315 n. 1 (arguing that substantive due process is a contradiction in terms).
9.
See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 208 (2004) ("[A]
doctrine of 'substantive due process' restores rather than violates the original historic meaning of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment ..
"); Ely, supra note 8, at 320 ("Disagreements about
the substantive dimensions of due process center on the meaning of the 'law of the land' clause
[of the Magna Carta].... [Tihe expression 'law of the land' is sufficiently comprehensive to
include substantive law as well as procedural safeguards."); McCormack, supra note 8, at 416
('"The Supreme Court's handling of a variety of 'procedural' due process cases shows that there is
some need for a federal substantive definition of rights of property and liberty.").
10. For example, Justice Scalia voiced his concerns over substantive due process in United
States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) and Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275-76 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice White expressed his concern
about cases "recognizing rights that have little textual support in the constitutional language" in
Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003). In his dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Black also argued against substantive
due process. 381 U.S. at 511-13 (Black, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Judge Posner on the
Seventh Circuit has also been highly critical of substantive due process, calling it an oxymoron.
Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982), quoted in Ely, supra note 8, at 315 n.2.
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Justice Scalia in particular has pointed out that the Court's
substantive reading does not fit into the literal text of the Due Process
Clause, which focuses on procedure.1 1 As he has written, the Due
Process Clause guarantees only two things: (1) certain procedures,
either defined in constitutional text or inherent in the notion of
fundamental fairness, and (2) adherence to the substantive
12
guarantees explicitly articulated in specific constitutional provisions.
In other words, according to Scalia, the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that one's life, liberty, and property not be taken away
without due process; it does not state that certain liberties can never
be taken away.13 Any affirmative constitutional rights that are
applicable to the states under this clause must be present in other
substantive provisions of the Constitution.1 4 The Court cannot
15
manufacture substantive rights under the aegis of "due process,"
unless these rights can be traced to a specific constitutional provision.
Proponents of a substantive reading of the Due Process Clause
argue that certain fundamental substantive rights are inherent in our
system of government.1 6 They further argue that the Due Process
Clause was intended to have a substantive component.1 7 Certain
fundamental rights are protected by this clause, including the right to
privacy. 18
While scholars disagree on whether the right to privacy may be
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, both sides of the debate
seem to agree that the Due Process Clause includes substantive rights
found in other provisions of the Constitution. This so-called
"incorporation theory" provides that substantive provisions of most of
the constitutional amendments have been incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and therefore are
applicable to the states.1 9 Thus, if the Court found that one of the
11. Albright, 510 U.S. at 275-76 (Scalia, J., concurring).
12. Id.
13. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 592 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. Albright, 510 U.S. at 276 (Scalia, J., concurring).
15. See id. ("Those requirements are not to be supplemented through the device of
'substantive due process.' ").
16. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) ("Due Process Clause
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition." (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
17. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 9, at 208 ("[A] doctrine of 'substantive due process'
restores rather than violates the original historic meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment ....).
18. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) ("The present case, then,
concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees.").
19. For a discussion of the incorporation doctrine regarding criminal procedures, see
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
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amendments incorporated into the Due Process Clause provided
constitutional protection of privacy, then it could bridge the gap
between the two sides of the debate over the substantive due process
right to privacy.
The Fourth Amendment offers one such substantive provision,
which may appropriately be applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects "the right
20
of the people" to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures."
Given that this amendment recognizes an affirmative right and
acknowledges the need for people to be secure in their "persons,
papers, houses, and effects,"' 2 1 the Court should recognize the
underlying privacy values of this amendment. In so doing, the Court
should shift its analysis from a privacy right created by substantive
due process to a privacy right grounded in the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of reasonableness.
Reasonableness tests, by their nature, require some sort of balancing
of interests. Therefore, the Court should borrow from its Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence and apply mid-level scrutiny to laws
that invade this Fourth Amendment right to privacy. 22 In other words,
the Court should consider whether the law substantially relates to an
important, legitimate government interest. 23 Where there is no
underlying legitimate interest, the intrusion is unreasonable, and the
law therefore fails mid-level scrutiny.
Part II of this Note will provide a brief overview of the current
law governing the search and seizure provision of the Fourth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due
process right to privacy. It will also describe the controversy
surrounding substantive due process. Part III of this Note will offer a
possible solution to this controversy by introducing a right to privacy
based in the Fourth Amendment. This Note will then explain why
mid-level scrutiny is the appropriate level of protection for the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy. Finally, this Note will conclude by
situating mid-level scrutiny within the Court's privacy jurisprudence.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW AND THE CONTROVERSY
This Part provides background information about the law
governing the doctrines discussed in this Note. It will begin with a

20. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21. Id.
22. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) ("To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a
statutory classification must be substantially related to an important governmental objective.").
23. See id. at 461-62 (explaining the mid-level, or intermediate, scrutiny test).
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discussion of the search and seizure provision of the Fourth
Amendment, including its historical roots and the major Supreme
Court decisions interpreting it. This Part will then explain the origins
of substantive due process and the substantive due process right to
privacy. Finally, this Part will offer a brief description of the
controversy surrounding the substantive due process right to privacy.
A. FourthAmendment Search and Seizure
1. Historical Roots
The Fourth Amendment was written with a clear purpose: a
purpose based upon the colonial experience. The values underlying
this amendment, as held by the American colonists, contributed in
part to the American Revolution. 24 American colonists were extremely
distrustful of two investigatory powers held by English officials:
general warrants and writs of assistance. 25 These two powers were
used to find "traitorous writings against the king of England or
smuggled goods," and gave governmental officials legal authority to
trespass on private property. 26 In 1761, Boston lawyer James Otis, Jr.,
representing Boston merchants, sued to stop the use of these legal
devices.2 7 In his argument Otis famously remarked:
Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty, is the freedoms of one's
house. A man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a
prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate this
28
privilege.

The young John Adams attended Otis's oral argument, and later
described this lawsuit as the ideological beginning of the American
29
Revolution.
After the American Revolution, the Framers sought to end the
writ and general warrant system. This was the historical purpose
24.

See PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: A FOURTH

AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 37-38 (2005) ("[Tlhe U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the Crown's
use of general warrants or writs of assistance during this period 'was a motivating factor behind
the Declaration of Independence.'" (quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967)).
25. DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER, EXPLORING THE CONSTITUTION SERIES: SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND
PRIVACY 1 (1994).
26.

Id.

27. Id. at 2.
28. HUBBART, supra note 24, at 366 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument of James Otis Jr.
Against the General Writs of Assistance, Petition of Lechmere (February 1761)). Otis's argument
in its entirety is presented in Appendix II of Professor Hubbart's book. Id. at 365-67.
29. JOHN CLARK RIDPATH ET AL., JAMES OTIS, THE PRE-REVOLUTIONIST at Chapter 11 (1998),
available at http://www.worldwideschool.org/librarylbooks/hst/biography/jamesotisthepre%2D
revolutionistlchap3.html (quoting a speech by John Adams).
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behind the Fourth Amendment. 30 Madison submitted the original
proposal in June of 178931 and it was similar to provisions in the
original constitutions of Virginia, New York, North Carolina,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. 32
There was some debate in the First Congress as to whether
this amendment should be made up of one clause, as proposed by
Madison, or two clauses, as proposed by the Virginia Convention. 33
The one-clause version "provided, in effect, that the subject right could
only be violated by the issuance of general warrants-thereby
confining the guaranteed freedom to a prohibition against general
warrants." 34 On the other hand, the two-clause version "widened the
scope of the guarantee to protect a general freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and expressly outlawed general warrants as, in
effect, an infringement of such freedom." 35 The House eventually
adopted the two-clause version. 36 The final version therefore provided
for a general right to be free from unreasonable searches, as well as an
express prohibition of general warrants.
The first Supreme Court decision to interpret the Fourth
Amendment came almost 100 years after its adoption, in the 1886 case
Boyd v. United States.37 In Boyd, a federal District Attorney filed a
civil information for seizure and forfeiture of property imported into
the United States in violation of the customs revenue laws.3 8 The
District Judge, under the authority of the Act of June 22, 1874, issued
an order requiring the claimants to produce the invoice for the
allegedly illegally imported goods. 39 Though this was a civil
proceeding, and there was no traditional search or seizure, the Court
had to consider whether "compulsory production of a man's private
papers in a proceeding to forfeit his property for alleged fraud against
30. See HUBBART, supranote 24, at 75-76. Hubbart wrote:
[T]he two purposes that the Framers wished to accomplish in adopting the Fourth
Amendment... were: (1) to end the abuse of general exploratory searches wrought by
the general writs of assistance regime by constitutionalizing the special writs or
special warrants practice of the common law; and (2) to empower the federal courts to
enforce the Fourth Amendment as a legal guarantee.
Id. at 75.
31.

THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 223

(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
32. Id. at 233-35.
33. Id. at 225 (quoting the House Debates on August 17, 1789).
34. HUBBART, supra note 24, at 75-76.
35. Id.
36. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 31, at 225 (quoting the House Resolution of
August 24, 1789).
37. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
38. Id. at 617, 634.
39. Id. at 618.
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the revenue laws [constitutes] an 'unreasonable search and seizure'
'4 °
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution[.]
The Court concluded that both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments were implicated by this question. 4 1 The two amendments
"run almost into each other," according to the Court, where there is
"any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of
his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to
forfeit his goods.
...42 Both involve "compelling a man to produce
evidence against himself." 43 Even though there was no actual search
or seizure in the Boyd case, and the proceeding was not criminal, the
Court nevertheless found that where a government action contains the
"substance and essence" of an actual search and seizure, and "effects
their substantial purpose," a search and seizure has occurred. 4 4 In
explaining its reasoning, the Court applied the doctrines of long
usage45 and liberal construction 4 6 and held:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty
and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the
court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employes [sic] of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property .... 47

Thus the Court would not be bound by an overly technical
constitutional interpretation. Instead, the Court demonstrated an
interest in protecting the underlying value of the Fourth and Fifth
48
Amendments: privacy.

40. Id. at 622.
41. Id. at 621.
42. Id. at 630.
43. Id. at 630-31. For further explanation of the interrelated nature of the two
amendments, see id. at 633-35.
44. Id. at 635.
45. See id. at 622 ("No doubt long usage, acquiesced in by the courts, goes a long way to
prove that there is some plausible ground or reason for it in the law, or in the historical facts
which have imposed a particular construction of the law favorable to such usage.").
46. See id. at 635. The Court described the doctrine of liberal construction:
[C]onstitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally
construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and
leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in
substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
Id.
47.
48.

Id. at 630.
M.C. SLOUGH, PRIVACY, FREEDOM, AND RESPONSIBILITY 46 (1969).
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2. The Exclusionary Rule
After Boyd, cases involving the Fourth Amendment were few
and far between until the 1960s. 49 There were, however, a few
significant cases during this quiet period. The first major case, Weeks
v. United States,50 considered how to handle violations of the Fourth
Amendment in criminal trials. The Court noted that if evidence
illegally obtained could be used against a criminal defendant at trial,
then "the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to
be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far
as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution."51 The Court's solution to this problem was to create
what has become known as the "exclusionary rule. '52 Under this rule,
evidence obtained through an unreasonable search or seizure of a
criminal defendant's person or property may not be used at trial
54
against that defendant. 53 This was intended as a prophylactic rule
and demonstrated the Court's strong interest in enforcing the Fourth
Amendment's guarantees.
Over the next forty years, however, a majority of the Court
backed away from this strong enforcement policy. In its 1928 decision
Olmstead v. United States, the Court concluded that wiretapping was
not a search or seizure. 55 The Court reasoned that the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments were exceptions to the common law rule that "the
admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means
by which it was obtained." 56 Where the amendments did not apply, the
common law rule governed.5 7 The Court therefore had to decide
whether the Fourth or Fifth Amendments applied to the case. In

49. As Professor Hubbart wrote:
Over 400 cases on the Fourth Amendment were decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
from 1791-2004. Only five of these cases were decided prior to 1900, and only 91 were
decided in the twentieth century prior to the landmark decision of Mapp v. Ohio
[1961], which applied the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states. The
balance, over 300 cases or 75% of the total, are post-Mapp decisions rendered during a
scant 43 year period, 1961-2004.
HUBBART, supra note 24, at 13 (footnotes omitted). For a summary review of all major Fourth
Amendment Supreme Court cases, see WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
HANDBOOK: A CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (2d ed. 2003).

50. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
51. Id. at 393.
52. Id. at 398.
53. Id.
54. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976); HUBBART, supra note 24, at 336.
55. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
56. Id. at 467.
57. Id.
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making this analysis, the Court found that the Fifth Amendment did
not apply unless the Fourth Amendment had been violated, 58 and the
Fourth Amendment had not been violated because there was "no entry
of the houses of [sic] offices of the defendants."5 9 Therefore, the
common law rule was the default, and the evidence obtained through
60
wiretapping was admissible.
This opinion was a departure from the doctrine of liberal
construction previously used in Boyd. While the Olmstead majority
paid lip service to this doctrine, the Court went on to say, "[The
doctrine of liberal construction] can not justify enlargement of the
language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses,
persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words search and
seizure as to forbid hearing or sight."61 This rigid interpretation of the
constitutional language prompted Justice Brandeis to dissent from the
holding in the case, and his dissent has since become famous for
emphasizing the values underlying the Fourth Amendment. 62 Justice
Brandeis wrote:
[The Framers of the Constitution] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be
let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
of facts
Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding,
63
ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.

Here, Justice Brandeis recognized the Fourth Amendment
privacy values that were first articulated by the Court in Boyd, and
further explained the interplay between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. In his view, where the Fourth Amendment was
violated, the Fifth Amendment constitutionally mandated the
exclusionary rule.
About twenty years later, in Wolf v. Colorado,64 the Court took
one step forward and two steps back in its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. In its step forward, the Court found that the
Fourteenth Amendment extended the protections of the Fourth
Amendment to the states, and described "[t]he security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police" as "the core of the

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 462.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 468-69.
Id. at 465.
MCWHIRTER, supra note 25, at 16-17.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367

U.S. 643 (1961).
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Fourth Amendment.."65 Unfortunately, in its two steps back, the Court
held, "[I]n a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the
Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." 66 In other words, the
exclusionary rule was not applicable to the states. Justices Douglas,
Murphy, and Rutledge each dissented from this holding. Justice
Rutledge argued in his dissent that "the Amendment without the
sanction is a dead letter," and emphasized, "The view that the Fourth
Amendment itself forbids the introduction of evidence illegally
obtained in federal prosecutions is one of long standing and firmly
established."67 Though this argument differed slightly from Brandeis's
finding that the Fifth Amendment demanded exclusion, both Justices
believed that the exclusionary rule was constitutional.
Justice Rutledge's view was finally adopted by a majority of the
Court in the 1961 decision Mapp v. Ohio.68 The Court held, "[A]ll
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state
court."69 Thus, the exclusionary rule was constitutional and applied to
70
the states as well as the federal government.
3. The Katz Test: When the Fourth Amendment Applies
Once the Court decided to exclude evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, it then had to figure out how to
recognize when evidence had been unlawfully obtained. This

65. Id. at 27-28.
66. Id. at 33.
67. Id. at 47-48 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
68. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
69. Id. at 655 (emphasis added).
70. The constitutionality of the exclusionary rule was called into question in the Court's
1976 decision, Stone v. Powell, where the Court held, "[W]here the State has provided an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not
require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976). The Court based its reasoning on the fact that "[p]ost-Mapp
decisions have established that the rule is not a personal constitutional right." Id. at 486.
However, this case appears to be the outlier. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent:
However the Court reinterprets Mapp, and whatever the rationale now attributed to
Mapp's holding or the purpose ascribed to the exclusionary rule, the prevailing
constitutional rule is that unconstitutionally seized evidence cannot be admitted in the
criminal trial of a person whose federal constitutional rights were violated by the
search or seizure. The erroneous admission of such evidence is a violation of the
Federal Constitution-Mapp inexorably means at least this much, or there would be
no basis for applying the exclusionary rule in state criminal proceedings ....
Id. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Since the exclusionary rule is still
applied to the states, it must be constitutional in origin.
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determination required two threshold questions: When does the
Fourth Amendment apply, and how is it violated? 71 The Court
provided an answer to the first question in its 1967 decision, Katz v.
United States.72 In Katz, the defendant was convicted in federal court
of violating a federal law that prohibited transmitting wager
information over the telephone. 73 At trial, the Government introduced
"evidence of the petitioner's end of telephone conversations, overheard
by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording
device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he had
placed his calls." 74 The petitioner claimed that the trial judge should
have excluded this recording, as it violated the Fourth Amendment.7 5
Like the Olmstead case, there was no traditional search or
seizure of the defendant or his personal effects. Unlike the Olmstead
case, however, the Court refused to be bound by an overly technical
reading of the Fourth Amendment that limited its scope to a person's
home. As the Katz Court noted, "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places." 76 Therefore, the Court held, "The Government's
activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's
words violated the privacy upon which [the defendant] justifiably
relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search
and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 77 Since
the FBI agents conducted this search and seizure without a warrant, 78
and warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable" 79 (subject to only a
few exceptions, none of which applied), the Court reversed the
80
conviction.
Justice Harlan wrote a concurrence to clarify the exact legal
test that the Katz majority was using, and his opinion has
subsequently been treated by courts and scholars as the applicable
law.8' While agreeing with the majority that the Fourth Amendment
protects people and not places, Justice Harlan pointed out that the
71.

Charles E. Moylan, Jr., Introductionto GREENHALGH, supra note 49, at 1.

72.
73.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 348.

74.

Id.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 351.
77. Id. at 353.
78. Id. at 356.
79. Id. at 357.
80. Id. at 359.
81. Because Justice Harlan's concurrence provides a clearer analytical model than the
majority's opinion, it has subsequently been used by the Court as the Katz test. See, e.g., Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing Harlan's concurrence as the applicable law);
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the law in Katz as
the "test enunciated by Justice Harlan's separate concurrence").
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analysis still "requires reference to a 'place.' ",82 Therefore, to answer
the question of when the Fourth Amendment applies, Justice Harlan
wrote, "[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' "83 If both of these questions are answered in the
affirmative, then the Fourth Amendment applies.
4. Reasonableness Test
Once the Court has determined that the Fourth Amendment
applies, then it must decide whether the contested search or seizure
was reasonable.8 4 The Court has taken a variety of approaches in
determining whether a search is reasonable.8 5 Generally, a warranted
search is reasonable, so long as the warrant is valid and executed
properly.8 6 However, if the warrant is not valid because it lacked
probable cause, then the search is valid only so long as the officer
executing the warrant was acting in good faith.8 7 In such a case, the
determination of reasonableness is based largely on the perceptions of
88
the officer executing the warrant.
Where there is no warrant, or the validity of the existing
warrant is in question, the Court sometimes invokes a balancing test
to determine the reasonableness of the search.8 9 This balancing test is
used to determine whether the exclusionary rule applies, 90 and

82. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
83. Id.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
85. See HUBBART, supra note 24, at 85-108 (describing three main approaches: historical,
balancing-of-the-interests, and common law reasoning).
86. This would meet the requirements of the second clause of the Fourth Amendment.
87. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-22 (1984); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.
531, 542 (1975).
88. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23. As Justice Stevens pointed out, however, this formulation
allows an unreasonable search to be made reasonable based on the good faith of the executing
officer. Id. at 960 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. The Court fluctuates somewhat on the importance of the warrant, depending on the
facts of the case. For example, in Katz v. United States, the Court wrote, "[S]earches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). For lists of the cases
invoking this formulation, see HUBBART, supra note 24, at 161-64 nn.1-3. On the other hand, the
Court has also recognized a general balancing approach for warrantless searches: 'Thus, the
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (citations omitted).
90. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21 (using language indicative of balancing when
determining whether the exclusionary rule applies); Peltier,422 U.S. at 542 (same).
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considers two factors: "(1) the high importance of individual privacy or
personal security and the degree of intrusion into that interest
represented by the search or seizure in question, as against (2) the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests served by such
intrusion."91 The Court demonstrated the balancing test in Winston v.
Lee:
Where the Court has found a lesser expectation of privacy... the Court has held that
the Fourth Amendment's protections are correspondingly less stringent. Conversely,
however, the Fourth Amendment's command that searches be "reasonable" requires
that when the State seeks to intrude upon an area in which our society recognizes a
significantly heightened privacy interest, a more substantial justification is required to
make the search "reasonable." Applying these principles, we hold that the proposed
implicate him in a
search in this case [for a bullet lodged inside the defendant that could
92
robbery] would be "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.

Two elements of this approach should be emphasized. First, the
93
government must have a legitimate interest in the information.
Second, the more intrusive a search or seizure is, the greater scrutiny
the Court will use in determining whether the search or seizure was
reasonable. 94 Thus, questions of legitimacy and reasonableness are
inherent in the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis.
5. Limitations to Application
Like most provisions of the Constitution, government action,
not private action, is necessary to implicate the guarantees of the
Fourth Amendment. A government acts through its employees or
through private individuals who function as "agent[s] of the
Government or with the participation or knowledge of any
governmental official." 9 5 The Fourth Amendment is not implicated
when an independent, private third party conducts the actual
search. 96 As explained by the Court in Katz, "[T]he protection of a
person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other
people-is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left

91. HUBBART, supra note 24, at 97. For a list of cases using the balancing approach, see id.
at 97 n.41.
92. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985) (citations omitted).
93. HUBBART, supra note 24, at 97.
94. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (emphasizing the "core" of the
Fourth Amendment as a "right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion" (citation omitted)); Winston, 470 U.S. at 759 ("A
compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence, however, implicates
expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable'
even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.").
95. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
96. Id.
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largely to the law of the individual States."97 There is no constitutional
right to be free from intrusion by other lay people-there is only
protection from governmental invasions.
Additionally, the individual seeking relief from the unlawful
search or seizure must be the same person whose "rights were violated
by the challenged search or seizure." 98 The defendant in a criminal
prosecution cannot assert the Fourth Amendment rights of a third
person, 99 even if that third person is a co-conspirator. 10 0 The Court has
therefore rejected the concept of "target standing," whereby a
defendant may assert Fourth Amendment protections merely because
that defendant is the target of a criminal prosecution. 10 1 The
defendant must have "personal standing" to challenge a search or
seizure. 102
B. FourteenthAmendment Substantive Due Process
The doctrine of substantive due process, on the other hand, is
based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
dictates that certain liberties are, to varying degrees, protected from
governmental intrusion. 10 3 In other words, certain liberties that are
not explicitly listed in the Constitution are nevertheless protected by
substantive due process. The degree of protection depends on the
relative importance of the liberty interest involved. There are two
levels of judicial scrutiny available: the rational basis test and the
compelling interest test. 0 4 The default is the rational basis test, which
asks: (1) whether there is a rational legislative objective underlying
the contested state regulation, and (2) whether there is a rational or
direct relation between the chosen regulation and the legislative
objective. 10 5 If a right is "fundamental," however, a court will apply the

97. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
98. United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77, 81 (1993) (citations omitted).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 82.
101. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132-34 (1978).
102. Id.
103. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 562 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992).
104. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 548 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[These tests] are judge-made methods for evaluating
and measuring the strength and scope of constitutional rights or for balancing the constitutional
rights of individuals against the competing interests of government.").
105. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) ("In the ordinary case, a law will be
sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems
unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems
tenuous."); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (explaining that the
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compelling interest test, which requires that the law is "narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest." 10 6 The rational basis test
is highly deferential and is easily met, while the compelling interest
test is quite demanding and rarely met. At times, however, these two
tests are not so clearly distinguishable.
According to several scholars, 10 7 the first appearance of
substantive due process was in the now famous 1857 Dred Scott
case. 108 The Court most notoriously used substantive due process to
strike down a state regulation in Lochner v. New York. 10 9 In Lochner,
the Court professed to use the rational basis test to invalidate a state
law that regulated the number of hours that a baker could work per
week.1 10 Justice Peckham, writing for the majority, found that there
was "no such direct relation to and no such substantial effect upon the
health of the employe [sic], as to justify us in regarding the section as
really a health law." 11 The Court found that the law was an
impermissible regulation of terms of employment, which violated the
freedom of contract.1 1 2 This decision was not at all deferential to the
choices of the state legislature, and seemed to apply something greater
than the rational basis test. As a result, Justice Holmes dissented
from the Court's opinion, rejecting the majority's decision to secondguess the legislature. 1 3 He noted that the temptation for courts to
legislate is particularly strong in the area of substantive due process,
114
and should therefore be avoided.
The concerns that Justice Holmes voiced in his dissent about
the demanding nature of the Lochner version of the rational basis test

rational basis test looks for two things: "an evil at hand for correction," and a finding that "it
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it").
106. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
107. Casey, 505 U.S. at 998 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 271 (1985)); BORK,

supra note 8, at 31. But see McCormack, supra note 8, at 406 (arguing that, in Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), the Court indicated that Lochner was an improper use of judicial
power, and this created the need to distinguish permissible procedural due process from
illegitimate substantive due process). The Due Process Clause itself was derived from Chapter 39
of the Magna Carta. Ely, supra note 8, at 320.
108. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
109. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), abrogated by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
110. Id. at 52, 56-57.
111. Id. at 64.
112. Id.

113. See id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (writing that he did not believe it was his duty to
interfere with the decisions of the majoritarian legislature).
114. See id. at 76 ("I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of dominant opinion ... ").
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were later vindicated. 115 The Lochner majority's rational basis test
was clearly no longer good law in Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, Inc.1 6 Although the Court found Oklahoma's law
"needless" and "wasteful," it nevertheless held, "[I]t is for the
legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of the new requirement."' 1 7 The Court further stated,
"The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise,
118
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."
Despite concerns that the judiciary might encroach upon the
legislature, the Justices of the Supreme Court have seemed willing to
make an exception for particularly important rights. For example,
even Justice Holmes wrote in his Lochner dissent:
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held
to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a
rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and
1 19
our law.

The Court subsequently brought this exception into being by
recognizing privacy as a fundamental right, protected by substantive
1 20
due process.
C. Substantive Due Process Right to Privacy
While the individual's interest in privacy certainly predates the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, 121 courts did not immediately
associate privacy interests with legal protection. The first American
legal scholars 22 to recognize this interest as an independent legal
115. In Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963), the Court found:
The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like cases-that
due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the
legislature has acted unwisely-has long since been discarded. We have returned to
the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.
116. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
117. Id. at 487.
118. Id. at 488.
119. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (quotation marks omitted).
120. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
121. Id. at 486.
122. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 2 (2006). This entry indicated:
[I]t was not until the publication in 1890 of a law review article by Warren and
Brandeis (later Justice Brandeis) that the right was introduced and defined as an
independent right and the distinctive principles upon which it is based were
formulated. That article ... synthesized at one stroke a whole new category of legal
rights and initiated a new field of jurisprudence.
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"right" were Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in The Right to
Privacy.123 In this article, Warren and Brandeis discussed how the
right to privacy had been latently present in the common law,
ancillary to property rights. 124 The scholars argued that the courts
should recognize and protect the interest in privacy as a distinct
right.125
After this article's publication, courts began to formally
recognize the invasion of privacy as a cause of action in tort. 126 As
Professor M.C. Slough noted, "Within less than three years following
publication of the Warren-Brandeis article, two lower courts had at
least conceded the existence of a legal right to privacy."'127 Congress
followed suit, enacting a series of laws to delineate the realms of
privacy that a person has the ability to defend through suits in tort.
Some of the major federal statutes involving privacy rights 128 include
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 129 the Privacy Act of 1974,130 the Right
to Financial Privacy Act, 31 the Video Privacy Protection Act, 3 2 and
the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988.133 Each of
these acts regulates the use and distribution of personal information
for reasons other than those for which the information was originally
collected. 134 However, these acts are limited in scope: They protect
against certain uses of information under statutory, not constitutional,
authority. Thus, they are not generally applicable to state matters.
In its pivotal 1965 decision, Griswold v. Connecticut, the
Supreme Court elevated the right to privacy beyond statutory and tort

Id.
123. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1890).

124. See id. at 204 ("Although the courts have asserted that they rested their decisions on
the narrow grounds of protection to property, yet there are recognitions of a more liberal
doctrine.").
125. See id. at 205 ("But if privacy is once recognized as a right entitled to legal protection,
the interposition of the courts cannot depend on the particular nature of the injuries resulting.").
126. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 5 (2006). See also supra note 18 (listing applicable cases).
127. SLOUGH, supra note 48, at 31.

128. These are the statutes listed in 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 19 (2006). For a more
detailed description of the federal privacy statutes, see Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the
Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195,
209-20 (1992) (Section II of the Article).
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a-x (2000).

130. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
131. 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (2000).

132. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000) (amending the Privacy Act of 1974).
134. See 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 19 (2006) (listing and describing major federal privacy
laws).
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law into the realm of constitutional protection.' 35 On appeal was a
lower court decision in which the executive and medical directors of
the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut were found guilty, as
3 6
accessories, of violating a law prohibiting the use of contraceptives.
Though the "right to privacy" is found nowhere in the language of the
Constitution, 1 37 the Court found that it was nevertheless present in
"emanations" from the various constitutional guarantees. 3 8 As the
Court stated, "[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance... [and these v]arious guarantees create
zones of privacy."'139 The regulation of contraception was therefore an
unwarranted intrusion into this zone of privacy, and was held

unconstitutional. 140
The Court reaffirmed this holding in its 1973 decision, Roe v.
Plaintiff Roe was an unmarried pregnant woman who wished
to have an abortion without being subject to state criminal
prosecution. 142 While admitting that "the Constitution does not
explicitly mention any right of privacy,"' 143 the Court, consistent with
its finding in Griswold, held that "personal rights that can be deemed
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are
included in [the] guarantee of personal privacy."'144 Thus, the Court
concluded:
Wade. 14 1

This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District
Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough5 to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
1
pregnancy. 4

135. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) ("[T]he right of privacy which
presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.").
136. Id. at 480.
137. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
138. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 485-86.
141. Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
142. Id. at 120.
143. Id. at 152.
144. Id. (citations omitted).
145. Id. at 153 (emphasis added). While the Ninth Amendment mentions rights "retained by
the people," courts rarely, if ever, use this amendment to strike down laws. BARNETT, supra note
9, at 234-35. Scholars such as Professor Barnett suggest courts look to the Ninth Amendment as
a source for rights such as privacy. See id. at 224-52 (arguing why a presumption of
constitutionality of laws conflicts with the mandate of the Ninth Amendment). Further, Justice
Black, in his Griswold v. Connecticut dissent, indicated that the historical purpose of this
amendment was to "assure the people that the Constitution in all its provisions was intended to
limit the Federal Government to the powers granted expressly or by necessary implication." 381
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The Court recognized the right to have an abortion as a
fundamental liberty, protected as part of the right to privacy inherent
in the Fourteenth Amendment. 146 It reasoned that "[w]here certain
'fundamental rights' are involved. . . regulation limiting these rights
may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest.' "147 In other
words, fundamental rights are judicially protected by strict scrutiny.
Since Griswold and Roe, Court decisions have retreated
somewhat from Roe's expansive description of constitutionally
protected "fundamental rights." To try to add an element of objectivity
to its fundamental rights analysis, the Court adopted a standard of
tradition 148 in Washington v. Glucksberg,149 Moore v. East
Cleveland,150 and Michael H. v. Gerald D. 151 In these cases, the Court
found that tradition did not protect the right to suicide, 152 but did
protect the "nuclear family" and its natural extensions, 153 and the
"marital family."'154 Furthermore, in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, the
Court announced the undue burden standard, which stated that only
those laws
that unduly burden fundamental
rights are
unconstitutional. 1 55 In Casey, the Court found that the state's
regulations requiring informed consent 56 and a twenty-four hour
waiting period prior to receiving an abortion 157 were not unduly
burdensome on a woman's fundamental right to choose an abortion,
but that a regulation requiring spousal notification created an undue
burden and was therefore constitutionally invalid. 58 The Court has
thus varied in how strictly it applies the compelling interest test to
state regulations affecting privacy rights.

U.S. at 520 (Black, J., dissenting). In any event, this Author believes that the Fourth
Amendment is a more appropriate source for the right to privacy, because of its more specific
language and roots in privacy values.
146. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("For also
fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
governmental intrusions into one's privacy.").
147. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
148. A right may be characterized as fundamental only if it has been historically and
traditionally valued as such.
149. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
150. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
151. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989).
152. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
153. Moore, 431 U.S. at 504. The Court found that "[tihe tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins,
and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots
equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition." Id.
154. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124.
155. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
156. Id. at 887.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 898.
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The distinction between the rational basis test and the
compelling interest test was again muddied in the Court's 2003
decision, Lawrence v. Texas. 159 In Lawrence, two men were arrested in
their private home for engaging in homosexual sodomy, which was
criminalized as "deviate sexual intercourse" by the Texas Penal
Code. 160 The Court purported to follow the rational basis test, but
rather than merely deferring to the legislature, the Court instead
struck down the Texas law criminalizing homosexual sodomy, holding,
"The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual."1 6 1 The Court did not consider whether the legislature
could possibly have had a rational motive, but instead discussed the
legitimate role of government and balanced this with the privacy
interests of the individual. 62 This case demonstrates that the Court
may find that certain privacy interests, though not "fundamental," are
important enough to deserve more protection than the extremely
deferential version of the rational basis test.
D. Controversy over Substantive Due Process Right to Privacy
The Court's efforts to determine which liberties are subject to
judicial protection under the Due Process Clause have prompted quite
a bit of criticism. Scholars generally disapprove of three things: the
Court's subjectivity, its contradictory constitutional construction, and
its politicization. To begin, scholars have criticized the Court's
subjective interpretation of the word "liberty."' 63 Given the breadth of
possible interpretations for the word "liberty," the Court has naturally
struggled to define the outer limits of this term. 164 As Chief Justice
Rehnquist emphasized, "As a general matter, the Court has always
been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due
process because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this
159. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
160. Id. at 562-63.
161. Id. at 578.
162. Id.
163. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 233. As Professor Barnett explains:
With [the Court's current substantive due process jurisprudence], judges now find
themselves having to pick and choose among the unenumerated liberties of the people
to find those that justify switching the presumption and those that do not. Courts are
placed in the uneasy position of making essentially moral assessments about different
exercises of liberty. A liberty to use birth control pills is protected, but a liberty to use
marijuana is not. The business of performing abortions is protected, but the business
of providing transportation is not.
Id.
164. See id. (describing the Court's difficulty in outlining the parameters of substantive due
process).
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unchartered area are scarce and open-ended."' 1 65 Even when the Court
does try to add objectivity to its analysis, such efforts often lead to
more confusion.
For example, the Court's introduction of the element of
167
tradition in Washington v. Glucksberg,166 Moore v. East Cleveland,
and Michael H. v. Gerald D168 was intended to add objectivity to the
Court's fundamental rights analysis. 169 Instead, however, cases
decided under the tradition analysis were inconsistent with prior
precedent, particularly regarding the justification for certain
decisions. In some cases, the fundamental nature of marriage seemed
to dominate, 70 while in similar cases, individual privacy was the basis
171
for decision.
The cases involving reproductive rights have created even more
confusion, particularly after the introduction of the undue burden
standard in Casey.172 Despite heavy judicial reliance on the Roe
trimester framework, 73 the Court summarily dismissed it as a valid
basis for analysis in Casey.174 Casey's undue burden standard was
introduced as a replacement by a three Justice opinion 75 and
previously had been articulated by Justice O'Connor in her dissent in
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 1.176 Justice
O'Connor further defined "undue burden" rather unhelpfully as a
"substantial obstacle."' 77 Thus, this standard does not offer much
guidance in predicting what regulations will be permitted.

165. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1994) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
166. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
167. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
168. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989).
169. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (describing the tradition approach
as an effort by the Court to add objectivity to its fundamental rights analysis, so that the Court
is not merely imposing its own values on the constitutional text), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
170. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124 (finding the personal interests of the biological father
subordinate to those of the married couple).
171. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (finding personal privacy interests
unaffected by the married status of a person).
172. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
173. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (describing the trimester framework in
Section XI of opinion); Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 ("Most of our cases since Roe have involved the
application of rules derived from the trimester framework.").
174. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
175. Id. at 843-44.
176. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health I (Akron 1), 476 U.S. 447, 463
(1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. at 87.
177. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
179. Id. at 887.
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Under the undue burden standard, Casey authorized a
regulation requiring informed consent,179 overruling previous
decisions to the contrary. 18 0 Casey also permitted a mandatory twentyfour hour waiting period,' 8 1 even though this also had previously been
held unconstitutional. 8 2 However, the Court struck down a regulation
requiring spousal notification as unduly burdensome.S 3 The only
distinction between these regulations appears to be the Court's
subjective determination of what constitutes an undue burden. Thus,
it is debatable whether the undue burden standard added anything
helpful 8 4 to the Court's already confused abortion jurisprudence.18 5
Furthermore, the subjective nature of the Court's analysis
seems particularly concerning given the unclear constitutional basis
for its decision-making. Rather than doing the intellectual heavylifting and basing its analysis in constitutional interpretation, the
Court has instead turned to policy justifications. In Griswold, though
claiming not to sit as a "super-legislature," the Court nevertheless
supported its decision to strike down a law against contraception use
by recognizing the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms."'18 6 Similarly,
in Roe v. Wade, the Court grounded its reasoning in a lengthy
historical analysis of the policies surrounding abortion.' 8 7 Due to the
fundamental and important nature of the reproductive rights
involved, the Court found the state's regulation of abortion
88
unconstitutional.'
Subsequent uses of this policy analysis have led the Court to
seemingly arbitrary distinctions between permitted and prohibited
abortion regulations. For example, the Court held that the state may
prohibit the use of public facilities, personnel, and funds to procure
abortions, 8 9 but the state may not prohibit a particular method of
180. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760 (1986),
overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. at 870; Akron I, 462 U.S. at 444; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 870
(acknowledging that the Court's decision overrules Thornburghand Akron 1).
181. Casey, 505 U.S. at 887.
182. Akron 1, 462 U.S. at 450; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 885 (acknowledging that the
Court's decision overrules Akron 1).
183. Casey, 505 U.S. at 898.
184. As Justice Blackman noted, "[Tihe Roe framework is far more administrable, and far
less manipulable, than the 'undue burden' standard adopted by the joint opinion." Id. at 930
(Blackmun, J. concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
185. Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized "the confused state of this Court's abortion
jurisprudence." Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
186. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482, 485 (1965).
187. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-52 (1973) (Sections VI and VII of the opinion).
188. Id. at 166.
189. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1989); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 469 (1977).
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abortion. 190 Additionally, while a state may require that doctors
perform tests on fetuses regarding age, weight, and lung maturity,19 a
state may not require that the fetal remains be disposed of in a
humane manner.1 92 These decisions demonstrate that the Court has
encountered difficulty in establishing the appropriate parameters for
abortion rights under substantive due process.
The Court's confused abortion and privacy rights jurisprudence
has created political controversy that threatens to undermine the
legitimacy and quality of the Court. In every judicial confirmation
hearing since Robert Bork (the first nominee to outright deny the
legitimacy of Griswold),1 93 the Senate has grilled judicial nominees
about their views on privacy and abortion. 194 This has turned
confirmation proceedings into even more of a political game than they
were before. As Justice Scalia wrote in his dissent in Casey, "Roe
fanned into life an issue that has inflamed our national politics in
general, and has obscured with its smoke the selection of Justices to
this Court in particular, ever since."1 95 The politicization of the Court
has naturally called into question the independence of the judiciary
from the other political branches.
Further, critics have found particularly problematic the
inherently contradictory nature of the Court's interpretation. The
Fourteenth Amendment, by its very own language, grants no
protection over life, liberty, or property; it merely guarantees
procedures. 196 The outcome of the requisite process is in no way
determined by the clause; only the procedures are implicated.1 97 The
Court's substantive reading, in effect, erases the words "without due
process of law" from the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving only "no
state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property." As a
190. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930-31 (2000).
191. Webster, 492 U.S. at 513, 519-20.
192. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 451-52 (1983), overruled
by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992).
193. See BORK, supra note 8, at 290-91 (acknowledging that his criticism of Griswold
triggered the campaign against him regarding his views on privacy).
194. Transcripts of the hearings and debates for confirmed judges are available at Supreme
Court Nominations Confirmed, http://www.loc.gov/rr/law/confirmed.html (last visited Nov. 2,
2006), and transcripts for the judges that were not confirmed are available at Supreme Court
Nominations Not Confirmed, http://www.loc.gov/rr/law/notconfirmed. html (last visited Nov. 2,
2006). For the Chairman's initial questioning of Judge Bork regarding the Griswold case, see
Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 112-21 (1989), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/law/nominations/bork/hearing-pt I.pdf.
195. Casey, 505 U.S. at 995-96 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
196. See supra discussion at text accompanying notes 8-15.
197. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 206.
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result, the Court has had to come up with an otherwise redundant
description of a procedural reading of the Due Process Clauseprocedural due process'98-to distinguish it from its oxymoronic
substantive due process construction. 199
Given this controversy, the Court should look to a better
constitutional interpretation, such that it may more legitimately
recognize the right to privacy. If the Court were to find a
constitutional provision that could more easily be read to provide for
some protection of privacy, then perhaps it could win over some of its
critics. A clearer constitutional foundation would remedy the
oxymoronic substantive due process problem at least with respect to
privacy, and the Court's subjectivity would be more easily forgivable
involving a more specific constitutional provision. The Fourth
Amendment provides this foundation.
III. A FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The Court should ground the right to privacy in the Fourth
Amendment. This amendment may be more easily interpreted as
encompassing a right to privacy and provides a more legitimate
constitutional construction. Having recognized the right to privacy,
the Court should apply mid-level scrutiny to laws that infringe this
right. To explain how this would be accomplished, this Part first
demonstrates why the Fourth Amendment is a preferable source for a
right to privacy than the Fourteenth Amendment. It then explains
how the Court could interpret the Fourth Amendment to provide for a
right to privacy. Next, this Part explains why mid-level scrutiny is the
appropriate protection for this right, and concludes by explaining how
this analysis would fit into the Court's existing privacy jurisprudence.

198. Id. at 207.
199. Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982); MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE
POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 213 (2005).
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A. Why the Fourth Amendment? The Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments Compared
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
-United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
-United

States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1

The constitutional right to privacy should be founded in the
Fourth Amendment. There are two main reasons why the Court
should shift the focus of its privacy analysis from the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Fourth Amendment. First, the words "persons,
houses, papers, and effects" in the Fourth Amendment can be (and
have been) rationally interpreted to include elements of privacy, and
do so more easily than the words "life, liberty, or property" in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Secondly, the Fourth Amendment, unlike the
Fourteenth Amendment, defines a substantive, affirmative right.
The Fourth Amendment was written to protect privacy, as
evidenced by the history of searches and seizures predating the
Fourth Amendment, as well as the Court's interpretations of the
amendment itself. 200 Although the Court declined to find a general
right to privacy against invasions by other private citizens in the
Fourth Amendment in Katz v. United States, the Court was silent as
to a generalized right to privacy against state action. 20 1 Historically,
scholars have recognized the Fourth Amendment as the amendment
most protective of privacy interests. As Professor Slough explained,
"The nearest to an explicit recognition of a right to privacy in the
Constitution is contained in the language of the [F]ourth
[A]mendment .... ,,202 Similarly, Professor William Cuddihy wrote,
"The [Fourth] Amendment's first clause, which explicitly renounces all
unreasonable searches and seizures, overshadows the second clause,
which implicitly renounced only a single category, the general

200. See supra discussion section II.A.1.
201. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
202. SLOUGH, supra note 48, at 44.
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warrant.... Privacy was the bedrock concern of the [Fourth
A]mendment, not general warrants."20 3 The Court has also recognized
the privacy values underlying the Fourth Amendment, as evidenced
by its decisions in Boyd v. United States, Weeks v. United States, Wolf
20 4
v. Colorado, and Mapp v. Ohio.
Additionally, a purely textualist comparison between the words
in the Fourth Amendment and those in the Fourteenth Amendment
reveals that the Fourth Amendment is more susceptible to an
interpretation involving privacy than the Fourteenth. For instance,
when choosing between the word "person" in the Fourth Amendment
and "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court should choose
the word "person," since it is more rationally subject to an
interpretation that includes privacy. The concept of "person" may be
said to include those private aspects of one's personal life that makes a
person an individual, 20 5 whereas the concept of "liberty" implies the
freedom to do anything.20 6 As articulated in Bolling v. Sharpe, "Liberty
under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is
free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper
governmental objective." 20 7 Thus, "person" invokes ideas of privacy
and autonomy, while "liberty" invokes more generalized notions of
freedom.
Secondly, while the language of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides procedural protections, the Fourth Amendment's language
provides a substantive guarantee. The affirmative guarantees of the

203. HUBBART, supra note 24, at 76 (quoting William Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment:
Origins and Original Meaning 602-1790 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation 1547, Claremont
Graduate School)).
204. See supra notes 37-70 and accompanying text.
205. Webster's Third International Dictionary's definition of a "person" includes: "an
individual human being," "the individual personality of a human being" and "a being
characterized by conscious apprehension, rationality, and a moral sense." WEBSTER'S THIRD
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1686 (1993). The Oxford English Dictionary's definition includes
"[tihe self, being, or individual personality of a man or woman, esp. as distinct from his or her
occupation, works, etc." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.oed.com. Finally, Black's
Law Dictionary defines a person simply as "a human being." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (8th
ed. 2004).
206. Webster's Third International Dictionary defines "individual liberty" as "the liberty of
those persons who are free from external restraint in the exercise of those rights which are
considered to be outside the province of a government to control." WEBSTER'S THIRD
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 205, at 1152. As defined by the Oxford English
dictionary, "liberty" is "[tihe condition of being able to act in any desired way without hindrance
or restraint; faculty or power to do as one likes" and "[u]nrestrained action, conduct, or
expression." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 205. Black's Law Dictionary defines
"personal liberty" as "[o]ne's freedom to do as one pleases, limited only by the government's right
to regulate the public health, safety, and welfare." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 205, at
937.
207. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
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Constitution are limited in number and scope; 208 therefore, where an
affirmative right is specifically listed, the Court should take special
notice and give effect to the substantive language. The Fourth
Amendment demonstrates a constitutional commitment of certain
areas-"persons, houses, papers, and effects"-to an elevated
protection. This protection is set forth in affirmative terms; that is,
"the right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches
and seizures." 20 9 It presupposes an underlying affirmative right of
privacy, which is protected from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Significantly, this right is absolute: It "shall not be violated."210 The
command of the Fourth Amendment is unqualified and unequivocal.
This differs from the Fourteenth Amendment, which restricts
only the method of governmental interference, when it says: "[N]or
shall any State deprive any persons of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." 21 ' While the Fourth Amendment asserts
an affirmative right of the people, the Fourteenth Amendment's
language limits the government's powers. The word "shall" is used in
both amendments, but the Fourteenth Amendment's language does
not limit the state with regard to which substantive liberties it may
regulate; instead, it limits the procedures the state may use when
interfering with those liberties. 21 2 Therefore, the Court should look to
a broader reading of the Fourth Amendment to find a right to privacy,
instead of an oxymoronic reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Reinterpretingthe FourthAmendment to Find Privacy Protection
The language of the Fourth Amendment may be interpreted to
create a right to privacy. The amendment is made up of two clauses:
one clause defines a substantive right, and the other clause provides
for a procedural protection of that right. The two clauses are separated
by the conjunction "and," indicating that they are independent from
each other. 21 3 The first clause states that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
208. For the provisions of the Constitution that provide for affirmative rights, see U.S.
CONST. art. I §§ 9-10, art. IV § 2, amends. I-VIII, X, XIII, § 1, XIV § 1, XV § 1, IXX, XXIV.
209. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
210. Id. (emphasis added); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) ("[The Fourth Amendment] guarantees to citizens of the
United States the absolute right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures carried out
by virtue of federal authority.").
211. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
212. See supra discussion at text accompanying notes 196-99.
213. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE R. 5.181, at 191 (15th
ed. 2003) (explaining that "and," when used as a coordinating conjunction, joins independent
clauses); supra Section II.A. 1 (describing the historical roots of the Fourth Amendment).
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unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. '2 14 The
second clause reads, "[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
215
seized."
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment defines a "right of
the people." This language articulates an affirmative, substantive
right, and also suggests that something more than the procedural
safeguards defined in the second clause may be needed to ensure that
the right is not violated. 216 To prevent unreasonable searches and
seizures, the Court should find that certain laws in and of themselves
violate the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects." 217 Enforcement of these laws would encourage
police to conduct searches or seizures that are unreasonable, because
the government's interest in regulation does not justify the intrusion
into its citizen's privacy. In other words, the laws themselves do not
justify the intrusion; as such, these laws should be struck down.
This reading suggests that a court's determination of whether a
search or seizure is reasonable necessarily requires an inquiry into the
substance of the law sought to be enforced. The rationale behind this
interpretation is grounded in values-based Fourth Amendment
reasoning. 2 18 The Amendment protects the "indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property," 219 "the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men,"220 and the "right to be secure against rude
invasions of privacy by state officers." 221 In the words of Justice
Brandeis, "To protect that right every unjustifiable intrusion by the
government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
222
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment."
Thus, to protect these values, the Court must look to the substance of
the law that the government seeks to enforce.
An analytical analogue can be found in the Court's recognition
of a legislative privilege in the Speech and Debate Clause of Article

214. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
215. Id.
216. See supra discussion at text accompanying note 203.
217. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
218. That is, a reading of the Fourth Amendment that gives effect to the values underlying
the amendment. See supra discussion at text accompanying notes 37-70.
219. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
220. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
221. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
222. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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In United States v. Johnson, the Court explained, "The legislative
privilege, protecting against possible prosecution by an unfriendly
executive and conviction by a hostile judiciary, is one manifestation of
the 'practical security' for ensuring the independence of the
legislature. ' 224 The Court concluded, "We see no escape from the
conclusion that such an intensive judicial inquiry . . . violates the
express language of the Constitution and the policies which underlie
it."225 Thus, the Johnson majority interpreted the Speech and Debate
Clause of Article I broadly, and considered the values underlying the
constitutional text to recognize a legislative privilege. The Court
should interpret the Fourth Amendment in the same way to recognize
a right to privacy.
Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence involves procedural
guarantees, and assumes the reasonableness of the underlying
substantive law sought to be enforced. Instead of making this
assumption, the Court should reinterpret the Fourth Amendment
using its reasoning in Lawrence v. Texas. 226 Lawrence presented a
theory of the proper role of the legislature: to preserve the public
health, safety, and morals. 227 While the vast majority of laws are
correctly considered reasonable because they are created to prevent a
public harm, a few laws are not reasonable because there is no public
harm to protect. This Note proposes that judges should use
intermediate scrutiny to assess the validity of laws implicating
228
government intrusion into personal privacy.
The Fourth Amendment right to privacy would function like a
prophylactic already in place for the Fourth Amendment: the
exclusionary rule. 229 Whereas the exclusionary rule reflects an effort
by the Court to prevent warrantless searches and seizures, this right
to privacy would allow the Court to protect the autonomous individual
from improper governmental interference. Also, like the Miranda
warning requirement under the Fifth Amendment, 230 the Fourth
1.223

223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
224. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966).
225. Id. at 177.
226. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
227. See id. at 562, 578 (emphasizing the distinction between the private realm of the
individual and the public realm of government).
228. See infra Section III.C.
229. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976).
230. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 (1966); see also Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S.
760, 770-71 (2003) (describing the privilege against self-incrimination as an "evidentiary
privilege that protects witnesses from being forced to give incriminating testimony, even in
noncriminal cases, unless that testimony has been immunized from use and derivative use in a
future criminal proceeding before it is compelled").
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Amendment right to privacy guarantees the underlying substantive
privacy values and prevents unreasonable searches.
The judiciary is the branch best situated to protect Fourth
Amendment privacy interests. As famously asserted by Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, "It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 2 3 1 As part of
this duty, courts must strike down those federal and state statutes
that violate the Constitution. 232 This view is consistent with the
Framers' intent to create an independent judiciary to act as a check on
the majoritarian legislature. 233 Thus, when it comes to protecting
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, courts have traditionally taken
on the role as protector. Therefore, a court, in recognizing a Fourth
Amendment right to privacy, would be fulfilling its traditional role.
This interpretation of the Fourth Amendment would
admittedly be a departure from the Court's traditional Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. However, this would be less of a departure
from realistic interpretations of the text of the Fourth Amendment
than was the substantive reading of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in the context of privacy. Other aspects of
substantive due process are outside the scope of this Note, but the
Fourth Amendment provides a more legitimate foundation for the
right to privacy.
A Fourth Amendment right to privacy would have several
benefits. First, the holdings of the major cases involving privacy rights
would not have to change. Mid-level scrutiny would lead to very
similar results. 234 Further, this reading would hopefully win over
supporters from those opposed to the substantive due process right to
privacy. While there is still room for subjectivity in the Court's
analysis, the subjectivity and balancing is demanded by the
reasonableness standard present in the language of the Fourth
Amendment. In other words, a subjective determination of
reasonableness is necessary because of the actual constitutional text,

231. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
232. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968) (describing the incorporation
of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, and application of these guarantees by the
Court to the states).
233. E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) ("But it must also be recognized that the Bill
of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the individual in the face of the
popular will as expressed in legislative majorities .. ");BARNETT, supra note 9, at 131 (quoting
Oliver Elsworth's speech to the Connecticut ratification convention on January 7, 1788); id. at
138 (quoting Thomas Jefferson's Letter to James Madison on March 15, 1789); id. at 141
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, 466 (Alexander Hamilton)).
234. For a detailed discussion of how this would happen, see infra Section III.C.
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and not because of a judicially-created doctrine of recognizing certain
liberties as fundamental.
Additionally, this approach does not create a generalized right
to privacy based on various constitutional guarantees, but instead
creates a "buffer zone" around the specific guarantee of privacy in the
Fourth Amendment. Even Professor Bork has noted approvingly,
"Courts often give protection to a constitutional freedom by creating a
buffer zone, by prohibiting a government from doing something not in
itself forbidden but likely to lead to an invasion of a right specified in
the Constitution."235 Where decisions are not squarely confined to a
literal reading of the constitutional text, Professor Bork wrote, "[They]
at least enforce[] values found in actual provisions of the
Constitution." 236 The practice of creating protections around the
guarantees of the Constitution has been recognized and regarded as
237
legitimate.
C. Applying Mid-Level Scrutiny
As mentioned above, the language of the Fourth Amendment
demands a balancing of interests through a standard of
reasonableness. The two tests currently available in the Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence are the rational basis test and
the compelling interest test. However, it is almost impossible for a law
to fail the rational basis test,238 and it is equally difficult for a law to
pass the compelling interest test. 23 9 Therefore, the Court should
borrow from its Equal Protection jurisprudence and adopt
intermediate, or mid-level, scrutiny 240 for the Fourth Amendment
right to privacy. This intermediate level of scrutiny is more balanced
than the other two options and actually allows a court to weigh

235. BORK, supra note 8, at 97.

236. Id. at 114. Bork continued later to say, 'Whatever line-drawing must be done starts
from a solid base, the guarantee of freedom of speech, of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures, and the like." Id. at 118.
237. For examples of the prophylactic doctrines in place for the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 498-99 (1966).
238. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) ("But the law
need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough
that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.").
239. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) ("[Substantive due process] forbids the
government to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.").
240. E.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) ("To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a
statutory classification must be substantially related to an important governmental objective.").
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competing interests. 2 41 Such scrutiny would require the courts to
consider whether a law that infringes upon privacy interests is
"substantially related to an important governmental objective. 242 If
the state has a legitimate and important governmental interest in
regulating the prohibited activity, then the privacy invasion is
justified. If the state does not have such an interest, however, the
privacy invasion is not justified and the law violates the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy.
This mid-level scrutiny is similar to the test applied in
Lawrence v. Texas 243 and is perhaps a more accurate description of the
level of scrutiny the Court actually applied in that case. As Justice
O'Connor explained in her Lawrence concurrence, "When a law
"exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group," the
244
Court has "applied a more searching form of rational basis review."
This is evidenced in the Lawrence case itself, where the Court found
that a law banning homosexual sodomy "furthers no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual. ' 245 This language suggests the Court was in fact
using a balancing approach-more like mid-level scrutiny-to reach
its decision.
Other language in Lawrence demonstrates the Court's
willingness to provide greater protection for privacy interests. The
Court held, "Liberty protects the person from unwarranted
246 It
government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places."
also found, "Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct." 247 Because it was basing its decision on the Fourteenth
Amendment texts, the Court described the privacy interests at stake
in this case as "liberty" interests. However, one could easily substitute
the word "privacy" for "liberty" in this case, without changing the
substantive meaning of the language, and find substantial support for
the application of mid-level scrutiny to laws affecting privacy rights.

241. See id. ("Between these extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level
of intermediate scrutiny...."); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980) (defining what is known as intermediate scrutiny, in the First Amendment
commercial speech context, as the balancing of four factors).
242. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220
(1995) (describing an identical test for intermediate scrutiny).
243. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
244. Id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
245. Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
246. Id. at 562.
247. Id.
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One can also look to the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence to find support for something greater than the rational
basis test as a means to protect privacy. As the Court noted in
Winston v. Lee, "[W~hen the State seeks to intrude upon an area in
which our society recognizes a significantly heightened privacy
interest, a more substantial justification is required to make the
search 'reasonable.' "248 Mid-level scrutiny would help determine when
the government was not justified in interfering with these areas of
heightened privacy interests.
Mid-level scrutiny also reflects a theory about the proper role of
the government in a democratic society. The very purpose of the
legislature is to interfere with the private lives and decisions of its
citizens to benefit the larger society. Where there are genuine
competing interests to resolve, the legislature may intervene and
resolve the conflict. As explained by Charles Bufford,
It thus appears that the inalienable rights of every one are subject to such regulation by
legislation as tends to prevent him in the exercise of his own inalienable rights from
unreasonably infringing upon those of others, and to secure to him the same
2 49
uninterrupted enjoyment of his own inalienable rights as others enjoy.

Similarly, Professor Christopher Tiedeman wrote, "The object
of government is to impose that degree of restraint upon human
actions, which is necessary to the uniform and reasonable
conservation and enjoyment of private rights. ' 250 Where the public
welfare is at issue, the legislature has the power to define those harms
that will not be tolerated, under threat of criminal prosecution. 25 1 The
state has a legitimate interest, inherent in its traditional police power,
in prosecuting those crimes that trump the individual's interest in
privacy. However, this legitimacy presupposes that there is some
harm.252 Normally, the legislature is given great deference to define
248. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985).
249. Charles Bufford, The Scope and Meaning of Police Power, 4 CAL. L. REV. 269, 272
(1916).
250. CHRISTOPHER TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT 1 (1886), available
at INFOTRAC.

251. See Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911) ("It may be said in a general
way that the police power extends to all the great public needs.... It may be put forth in aid of
what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant
opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare."); Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906) ("We hold that the police power of a State
embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as
well as regulations designed to promote the public health, the public morals or the public
safety.").
252. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("It is enough that
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative
measure was a rational way to correct it." (emphasis added)).
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harm, 253 but courts should impose some rational boundaries. Where
there is neither a discernible personal or societal injury involved nor a
public forum requiring state regulation, the state may not impute
harm on a purported victim and criminalize the perpetrator for that
hypothetical harm. 254 In other words, the state does not have a
255
legitimate interest in pure, abstract moralizing.
The "pure moralizing" line is admittedly somewhat simplistic:
All crimes are based on a moral system. 256 Because society thinks it is
wrong to kill another human being, the state defines murder as a
social harm and criminalizes it. Therefore, the state must be given
deference in defining harm and the means for its prevention, whether
its laws concern the general welfare of society or a direct injury to an
individual. 25 7 This follows the Lockean theory of harm and police
power as articulated by Professor Randy Barnett. 258 Where there is a

253. As Justice O'Connor explained in her Lawrence concurrence, "Under our rational basis
standard of review, 'legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.'" Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
254. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 49 (1993), quoted in BARNETT, supra note 9, at

331 ("An exercise of legislative powers would be considered valid only if it could reasonably be
justified as contributing to the general welfare. The adjudicative task was to give meaning to this
standard."); TIEDEMAN, supra note 250, at 291 ("No law can make vice a crime, unless it becomes
by its consequence a trespass upon the rights of the public."), quoted in BARNETT, supra note 9,
at 329; Bufford, supra note 249, at 276 ("[T]his regulatory power does not authorize interference
with individual freedom or individual property to protect individuals from doing injury to
themselves, unless consequences harmful to the public, tend to result therefrom.").
255. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (adopting Justice Stevens's view in his Bowers dissent);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("First, the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice .. "),overruled by Lawrence, 539
U.S. 558; see also Bowers, 539 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Petitioner and the Court
fail to see the difference between laws that protect public sensibilities and those that enforce
private morality."); BARNETT, supra note 9, at 331 ("On the other hand, were the state allowed
the power to prohibit any purely private activity on the sole ground that a majority of the
legislature deems it to be immoral, there would be no limit on state power since no court could
review the rationality of such a judgment.").
256. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 ('CThe law, however, is constantly based on notions of
morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the
Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.").
257. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 572 (The

Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1999) (1st ed. 1868) (describing the police power of the state as
necessary "to prevent offences against the State" and "conflict of rights"); 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: OF PUBLIC WRONGS 162 (1st ed. 1765-

69), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/blackstone/blacksto.htm (describing police
power as necessary to maintain peace between neighbors).
258. See BARNETT, supra note 9, at 323-34 (describing Locke's theory as setting forth the
proposition that the police power of the state is derived from the need for a governmental entity
to resolve conflicting private interests and prevent one person from harming another).
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discernible conflict or harm, the state has met its burden to
demonstrate a legitimate interest that overrides the individual
privacy interest. However, where the only identifiable interest in
regulation is moralizing, and the promotion of private, rather than
public, interests, the regulation is presumptively invalid. 259 Absent a
demonstration that the state is addressing a direct injury or larger
social harm, regulations that ban conduct that "neither harmed others
nor took place in the public sphere where government must balance
260
competing uses by different citizens" are illegitimate.
D. Fitting a FourthAmendment Right to Privacy into the Court's
Jurisprudence
This Fourth Amendment right to privacy would follow the
balance between the government's interests in regulating conduct and
the individual's interest in privacy that courts have already recognized
in a number of other contexts. For example, a similar balance is struck
at the trial level with evidentiary privileges. The Supreme Court has
used the authority granted to it by Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence to recognize several testimonial privileges. 26 1 For example,
in Jaffee v. Redmond, the Court recognized a psychotherapist-patient
privilege, finding that the interest in protecting confidential
communications outweighed the interest in disclosure. 262 Similarly, in
Trammel v. United States, the Court found the relationship between
spouses was "rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust,"
and therefore continued to recognize a spousal privilege. 26 3 Other
commonly recognized privileges include: "priest and penitent, attorney
and client, and physician and patient. 2 6 4
Additionally, the language that the Court would use to analyze
cases under the Fourth Amendment right to privacy would not differ
drastically from the language it used when characterizing the
substantive due process right to privacy. For example, in Casey, the
Court reasoned:
259. This rationale parallels the injury in fact requirement for purposes of standing. A
psychological or moral injury is not enough; one must be actually harmed to have standing to
bring suit in federal court under Article III of the Constitution. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (describing the three requirements for Article III standing).
260. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 334. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 52 (Edward
Alexander ed. 1999) (4th ed. 1869) ("[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.").
261. FED. R. EVID. 501.

262. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996).
263. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
264. Id. at 51.
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Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education ....These
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could 2not
define the attributes of personhood were they
65
formed under compulsion of the State.

The Court's uses of "personal dignity," "autonomy," and "personhood"
are significant because they may easily be linked to the Fourth
Amendment word "person." Therefore, a shift in analysis from the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of "liberty" to the Fourth
Amendment's concept of "person" would not be very difficult. This
could similarly be accomplished in Lawrence, where the Court says,
"Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. ' 26 6 The
notion of "autonomy of self' would in fact more suitably be attributed
to the values underlying "person." Therefore, the language of the
Court related to privacy would not dramatically change.
While the language describing the underlying right to privacy
would remain largely the same, the Court would have to revisit more
carefully its highly politicized and controversial holdings regarding
laws that impute harm on the individual. It would have to apply midlevel scrutiny to these cases. Examples include the Court's holdings
allowing the regulation of suicide in Glucksberg267 and prohibiting the
regulation of reproduction as described in Eisenstadt,268 Roe, 269 and
70
Casey.2
Regarding suicide, the Court in Glucksberg found a statute
banning suicide constitutional, using the tradition element of its
substantive due process analysis.2 7 1 Under a Fourth Amendment
analysis, the Court could similarly find that regulation of suicide is
constitutional. A person's privacy is infringed when a state prohibits
suicide; however, the state has a legitimate interest in "preserving the
lives of those who can still contribute to society and enjoy life. ''27 2 This
is because this governmental interest goes beyond merely interfering
with a person's private choices: It reflects a systematic state interest
in preserving the lives of its citizens, which helps maintain a healthy
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (emphasis added).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (emphasis added).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (Section XI of the opinion).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
521 U.S. at 728.
Id. at 729 (quoting Brief for Respondents 35 n.23).
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society. The Court has recognized suicide as a legitimate societal harm
and "serious public-health problem," 2 73 and therefore, the state's
interest in regulating suicide defeats the privacy interests of the
individual.
A situation like Eisenstadt,274 in which the state regulates the
distribution of contraceptives, presents a different problem because
the sale of contraceptives is commercial. Given the public nature of
this transaction, the state has an interest in regulating it as
commerce. Thus, the sale and purchase of contraceptives is not clearly
purely private conduct and is not easily distinguishable from engaging
in prostitution 275 or running an adult movie theater, 276 which are both
subject to state regulation due to the competing public interests
involved. The display and sale of contraceptives, just like the display
and sale of adult toys or movies, is public. One could argue that there
is a social harm in such a display. Therefore, the Court must
distinguish these activities on other grounds.
First of all, one could fashion a First Amendment argument
that distinguishes the permissible advertisement and display of
2 77 of
contraceptives from the impermissible advertisement and display
obscene materials. In fact, this argument has been used successfully
in the past. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, the Court held that a state may not "completely
suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about
entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its
disseminators and its recipients." 278 In Carey v. Population Services
International, the Court applied this rule to a Virginia law banning
the advertisement of contraceptives, and struck down the statute as
violative of the First Amendment. 279 Thus, the government cannot
criminalize the public display of contraceptives.
This leaves the physical sale of contraceptives. In order to
distinguish this from the sale of, for example, illegal drugs, the Court
must look at the legislative purposes behind the statutes. A statute
that criminalizes the sale of illegal drugs is presumably aimed at
eliminating the social harm that is the use of those drugs. Following
this reasoning, a statute that criminalizes the sale or distribution of
contraceptives must be aimed at the use of those contraceptives. As
273. Id. at 730.
274. 405 U.S. at 440.
275. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (indicating the regulation of
prostitution is a legitimate state interest).
276. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986).
277. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973).
278. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976).
279. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700 (1977).
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the Court noted in Carey, "Indeed, in practice, a prohibition against all
sales, since more easily and less offensively enforced, might have an
even more devastating effect upon the freedom to choose
contraception."' 28 0 Since the public nature of the display of
contraceptives is protected under the First Amendment, the only
reason a state might have for regulating the sale of contraceptives is
in fact to prohibit the use of contraceptives. The regulation of this
public activity is effectively a regulation of the private use of the
contraceptives, and therefore should be treated as such. Since there is
no additional harm in the actual sale itself (as distinguished from, for
example, prostitution where the actual sale involves the exchange of
sex for money), there is no legitimate interest in prohibiting the sale,
and the regulation fails mid-level scrutiny.
The next logical step is to consider how this framework applies
to the regulation of abortion. One could make an Eisenstadt argument:
a ban on the performance of abortions is an effective ban on a woman's
ability to have an abortion and therefore is illegitimate. Whether a
woman's ability to have an abortion is protected would require the
application of mid-level scrutiny. The Court would have to ask
whether the state had an important, legitimate interest in prohibiting
abortion. Applying the harm test, the Court could reaffirm its decision
in Casey and find that there is no regulable harm prior to fetus
viability.28 1 This is an appropriate line to draw regarding the
permitted, legitimate state interests in regulation, because, as the
Court held:
[T]he concept of viability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at which there is a realistic
possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the
independent existence of the second life can in reason and 28
all2 fairness be the object of
state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman.

Thus, there is a regulable harm after fetal viability, when there
is an "independent existence of a second life," which creates a
competing interest for the legislature to resolve. While the state
always has a legitimate interest in regulations promoting the health of
the mother, the state does not have a legitimate interest in protecting
28 3
fetal life before viability.
Admittedly, this line is a subjective one. The Fourth
Amendment's use of the word "reasonable," however, necessarily
requires the Court to make a value judgment, and determine whether
an imputed harm is a legitimate one. Thus, the Court must determine

280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 688.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
Id. (emphasis added).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973).
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legally when to recognize the competing interest of the fetus. As
Justice Blackmun indicated in Roe, the determination of when life
begins is a moral, religious, and philosophical decision. 28 4 Like
religious choices, 28 5 this determination must be left largely to the
individual. However, like the legal determination of when a child
becomes an adult, 286 the law must recognize that, at some point, there
can be little doubt as to whether life has begun. The Court recognized
this point as the time of viability, when the fetus could survive outside
of the womb, and is therefore alive as an independent second life. This
decision reflects a balancing of the interests involved. Thus, the
mother's right to privacy applies up to the point when a fetus is viable.
After this point, the state's interest in regulation outweighs the
individual's privacy interests.
Regulations involving the waiting period, informed consent,
and spousal notification should receive similar treatment. Instead of
applying the undue burden standard, the Court should consider
whether there is a legitimate state interest in these regulations. Since
the marital relationship is privileged in court, and traditionally has
been treated as private, 28 7 the state does not have a legitimate interest
in dictating what communications take place between husband and
wife. Therefore, the spousal consent regulations would remain void.
Those regulations involving a waiting period and informed consent
may be permitted so long as they relate to the legitimate state interest
of providing for healthy choices and protecting the mother against
harm. 288 Thus, the Court's holding in Casey should remain
undisturbed.
IV. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Court should reinterpret the right to privacy
as a protection arising out of the Fourth Amendment rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment. This would require the Court to rethink the
constitutional justification for its privacy jurisprudence, but would not
require the Court to overrule its previous decisions. The mid-level
scrutiny that the Court would use to protect this right would produce
nearly the same holdings as the court's prior privacy cases.
So why make this change in the constitutional basis for the
right to privacy? Because the Fourth Amendment offers a more

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at 159-61.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
See supratext accompanying notes 179-83.
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legitimate constitutional foundation for two main reasons. First of all,
the Fourth Amendment includes substantive language, in which it is
more appropriate to base an affirmative right than the procedural
language of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Secondly, the language of the Fourth Amendment is more susceptible
to interpretations involving privacy, and has historically been
interpreted to encompass values of privacy.
In accepting a Fourth Amendment right to privacy, the Court
must recognize that the determination of the reasonableness of a
search requires an inquiry into the substantive law sought to be
enforced through the search. If the underlying law does not justify the
invasion into privacy, then the search is unreasonable. To prevent the
police from conducting unreasonable searches, therefore, a law that
does not meet mid-level scrutiny should be struck down as violating
the right to privacy.
Mid-level scrutiny is the appropriate level of protection for this
right because the word "reasonable" in the Fourth Amendment
suggests a balancing of interests. Whereas the rational basis test and
the compelling interest test presume either the legitimacy or the
illegitimacy of the law in question, mid-level scrutiny requires a closer
look at the interests involved. This scrutiny asks whether the
governmental interest behind the contested law is legitimate, which
invokes an analysis of whether the law in question addresses a public
harm.
Adopting a mid-level scrutiny approach would reflect a basic
theory regarding the scope of police power. Under this systematic view
of police power, the state may interfere with the private lives of its
citizens only where there is a legitimate public interest in
governmental regulation. When there is a legitimate public interest,
the state's regulatory power trumps the privacy interests of its
citizens. Where there is neither harm nor competing public values to
resolve, the state cannot interfere.
At the core of this right to privacy is the basic proposition that
society has consented to a majoritarian system of governance over
general liberties and the reconciliation of competing interests, but
society has not consented to governance over choices related to basic
personal autonomy where the public welfare is not implicated. The
Framers recognized this when they wrote the Fourth Amendment, and
the Court should give effect to the absolute right articulated in this
amendment by recognizing a Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
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